<TITLE: 5th Symposium of Russian and East European Studies: Workshop on EU, Russia and the Politics of Northern Energy Resources
ACADEMIC DOMAIN: social sciences
DISCIPLINE: Russian studies
EVENT TYPE: conference discussion
FILE ID: CDIS070
NOTES: session includes presentations CPRE07A-C

RECORDING DURATION: 35 min 9 sec

RECORDING DATE: 17.3.2005

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 15

NUMBER OF SPEAKERS: 9

S1: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: Finnish; ACADEMIC ROLE: senior staff; GENDER: male; AGE: 31-50

S2: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: Russian; ACADEMIC ROLE: senior staff; GENDER: male; AGE: 31-50

S3: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: Russian; ACADEMIC ROLE: senior staff; GENDER: male; AGE: 51-over

S4: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: Finnish; ACADEMIC ROLE: senior staff; GENDER: male; AGE: unknown

S5: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: German; ACADEMIC ROLE: senior staff; GENDER: female; AGE: 31-50

S6: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: Estonian; ACADEMIC ROLE: senior staff; GENDER: male; AGE: 31-50

S7: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: Finnish; ACADEMIC ROLE: other; GENDER: female; AGE: 31-50

S8: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: Bulgarian; ACADEMIC ROLE: senior staff; GENDER: male; AGE: 31-50

S9: NATIVE-SPEAKER STATUS: Finnish; ACADEMIC ROLE: research student; GENDER: female; AGE: 24-30

SU: unidentified speaker

SS: several simultaneous speakers>


<S1> welcome everyone er to this er panel session which is about er ac- actually our workshop session i i should er correct which is about er er european union and er russia er with a particular reference on the er energy er so-called energy dialogue between european union and russia er that was started in in 2000 and er which now we think er forms er a very central part of overall er EU-russian er relations and where er integration is actually er progressing relatively er smoothly despite of numerous technical and more er fundamental er problems er as well this is an area which is er keeping in many respects er keeping up the EU-russian er dialogue er in in the more er general er sense and er we have er here er speakers er er during the sessions er from a from our project er international collaborated project which is er studying er the issue from with the focus on northern european er developments and what sort of a role northern europe and baltic sea region play in this er energy er dialogue so-called energy dialogue and er the speaker we have today we have er <NAME S2> from st petersburg state university <NAME S2> is er an international relations and a political scientist er scholar and er she has been er studying EU-russian er relations and er issues related to that like er identity politics for example and i think er i will give the fo- floor er first to you and after <NAME S2> we will er have er <NAME S3> also from st petersburg state university <NAME S3> is also vice-rector of er international er relations er section in the within the university and and professor er as well and his interest has have been in international finance international political economy and EU-russian relations and also russia-baltic er relations er i think is one of them and after <NAME S3>'s presentation we will have er <NAME S5> er from the giessen university er germany and she's an expert on on especially on russian and er european union's er positions er within the er energy dialogue so er i should er probably call s- also <NAME S5> a russianist er as as as a scholar i think and as a discussant we will have er <NAME S6> er professor of international relations from the er university er of er tartu er i'm very pleased to er have er ask er <COUGH> <NAME S2> to start and i will er ask each speaker to er use in maximum er 15 minutes and er then the discussions er if you manage to do it quicker than that fine but er you will have around er 15 minutes </S1>
<S2> okay thank you <NAME S1> </S2>

<PRESENTATION CPRE07A by S2>

<S1> thank you thanks for er keeping very strictly er to the time limit and <NAME S3> please </S1>

<PRESENTATION CPRE07B by S3>

<S1> for a very concise presentation and er we now s- move to <NAME S5> </S1>

<PRESENTATION CPRE07C by S5>

<S1> thank you and er i think next er <NAME S6> will raise a couple of er issues from the papers and er after that er we will be er collecting er questions from the floor without er unfortunately the presenters having had a chance to respond immediately we would rather collect questions from the floor in order to open debate so er please <NAME S6> <S6> [mhm-hm] </S6> [about ten minutes] would be okay </S1>
<S6> yeah thank you very much er actually i enjoyed very much these papers and you as er editor of the book should be really happy because really all these papers are w- very well in in progress and and are in very good shape er to start with er i would er say something about <NAME S2> paper er for me you posed quite many questions and er i would ask you to to elaborate more er on two things one thing is erm the question whether er democratic russia is more reliable partner for the EU or not you you really didn't answer that question you posed that but you didn't answer and the the second thing is er erm , er the s- the second the second question has to do with with these kind of political prerequisites er you you wanted to put it as as er , russia's oil export to the EU is somehow politically conditioned and i wonder how er if there is if it depends w- what is the standing point or a starting point whether we can talk about dependency or interdependency er maybe you can also er elaborate it also further er but at the same time er among these three papers er <NAME S2> paper and and <NAME S5> paper were were quite similar in a way that <NAME S2> presented some russian views and then <NAME S5> presented two western views or EU or german views er so take it as you want er er in in that sense it it was very interesting to compare these these views now about er <NAME S3> paper which i also found very interesting erm that was more focusing on on different actors and the role on er shaping er energy stra- strategy in russia erm , did i understand you correctly when you said that er that er in russia and among when we're talking about different actors they they all behave in a one i- in in a quite similar way er that there is more cooperation than conflict and that that this field we er given that field and and kind of <SIC> strategical </SIC> importance for russia's economy then one can say that russia is a kind of unitary actor is it is it true er maybe maybe you can say something more about that and also if that's particular sector is so important for russia as we all know er how does er , how does it er , er influence foreign policy conduct , er how we the the kind of er oil strategy has become a part of this foreign policy conduct in russia <COUGH> as to <NAME S5>'s paper erm </S6>
<NOISE FROM THE CORRIDOR, DOOR OPEN>
<S4> close the door </S4>
<S9> and then just close </S9>
<S6> i would i would also ask you to to elaborate a bit further on how er kind of putin's schroeder's personal relationship has had a impact on on german-russian relations and maybe you you you give some some more evidences on that how how it has really er gave a kind of foreign policy impact er not not simply talking about er er a kind of indifferent position of what is going on in nowadays' russia but but maybe some specific cases where you one can say that just because of that personal relationship german germany behaves in a way like it like it behaves , erm , i found very interesting these er er two storylines but again it should be er more strongly emphasised who argues what and why what are these different er sides who express these views one was kind of market er er market economy view or liberal liberal er view and the other one was more more realist more geopolitical view and last but not least er that was something surprising for me your one of your your er last findings that er EU actually lacks a coherent energy policy and and n- now the question is if er if we we er assumes that er that er most of the western european countries also the member states of the EU are rather dependent on on energy resources and also something that comes from russia then how this kind of bilateral relations er influence general EU energy policy , so much about it </S6>
<S1> thank you thank you very much for raising er all of these issues and er i think next er we should er we collect er a couple of er questions and er then give a chance er for the speakers to er respond and then we will collect also another s- er round of questions so <NAME S4> please also introduce yourself </S1>
<S4> erm i have the one question er to er er er starting er about er <FOREIGN> da </FOREIGN> erm the government oil prices and erm er the internasal international oil prices are higher than the internal er exter- internal er oil prices in russia and this is of course against er the system of er double-T-U-A V-T-O and er how russia shall shall vote this question </S4>
<S1> thank you and there were also er <NAME S7> from STETE </S1>
<S7> yes thank you erm er all were very interesting and and combining each other i'd like to ask mr <NAME S2> <NAME S2> er that you say that much depends on creating a shared identity between russia and western europe and then you write in in the text that russia feels more comfortable with state oil companies from china and india er so it is that europeans and chinese are competing somehow in the future maybe er so i wonder if in this present climate chinese will be winning or do you think we will be hearing more of these schroeder-like er comments from other europeans leaders like putin's a great democrat and friendly ties do you think will happen </S7>
<S1> thank you then there was one question from the back er <S8> yes </S8> [yes] </S1>
<S8> [i am] <NAME S8> from pan-european institute in turku and my question is for all the russian participants so it is not secret that any oil company in the world is used by their government as a political leverage so there is no problem with that but the concern of the countries in the european union is to what extent are the russian oil companies used as a leverage and how independent they are in their investment decisions you can briefly comment on that </S8>
<S1> and then we take one more question before the next round <NAME S9> <WRONG SURNAME> from the university of tampere <S9> @<NAME S9> @ [@@] </S9> [er <NAME S9> again sorry i'm mixing up constantly] </S1>
<S9> @@ this is to <NAME S2> i think this question er about the re- renewable energy resources erm so is it true that the new russian energy strategy doesn't even actually mention the renewables and then erm what do you think how how the kyoto protocol erm will influence the russian-EU energy dialogue or will it <S6>  mhm-hm </S6> have an impact on it </S9>
<S1> okay thank you er we now er give you a chance to say something in back er we will start with <NAME S2> and then to <NAME S3> and then to <NAME S5> </S1>
<S2> okay well erm <COUGH> er actually i i should thank er er <NAME S6> for giving me a chance to present a sort of er the summary i thought i i was going to do it but i didn't have time for that er i think that erm talking about political prerequisites erm for the EU-russia energy dialogue er there are two major political factors er which actually have a role in the whole process er and one is actually i think it's it's crucially important i- it's that we are witnessing as i said the process of building two europes instead instead of one europe whole and free and er mhm er and it's not only on the russian side that russia doesn't want to be a part of this EU europe or EU NATO europe or council of europe europe erm it's just that russia feels alienated very often er from the EU europe from er the west in general especially if you take the ukrainian case of course one can blame the the russian government for being too straightforward and er whatever in its support for yanukovich but at the same time er in the western media the situation was described quite simply ukraine makes a crucial choice between its russian between russia and the west meaning between its authoritarian past and its bright european future that's the idea er of course er i mean it's difficult to to to to er imagine europe whole and free in such a situation when we start from from these assumptions so this is the first er political factor and the second one is as i as i i would say institutional design at least in russia it's the fact that erm er russian political system is tuned to short-term planning er whether i would describe it as interdependency or dependency it depends really on what question er you're you're addressing really because er you can go forever saying that okay well half of the russian exports to the EU so russia is dependent from the EU but on the other hand this half of the exports is what it's er energy mostly <S6> [mhm] </S6> [so the] EU EU is dependent on russia but then does russia has do- does russia have any any you know big freedom to to to regulate these energy supplies or is it dependent on a currency inflow which is generated by by this energy export yes russia is dependent so in the end it's interdependency but at each stage you can at at at at each question you can erm more or less put er i think there is more power in some questions russia has more leverage and other in other questions er in other fields the EU has more leverage which is normal of course for any situation <S6> [mhm] </S6> [of] interdependence and i think what is important is to understand that it's interdependence and not to try and say okay we'll we'll er just cut off georgia from energy supply without thinking what repercussions it will have in the wider european context for example er and coming to the question of the more democratic russia as a more reliable partner for the EU in general yes but on the other hand if we if we did talk about energy supplies i would probably argue that saddam hussein's iraq could have been a more reliable energy suppliers for the world market than whatever we have now er it's probably more democratic now than it used to be under saddam hussein but is it a more reliable energy supplier i would doubt at least at this stage and er we m- we don't we don't know how long this predicament will last so in general yes probably but er when it comes to specific areas again it can be more difficult er i think i i i more or less answered your question about <S6> [mhm] </S6> [shared] identity i think it's it's really an important issue it's one of the crucial problems for the future of russia in europe er and i think the the the chinese and japanese factors are important and the asian factor factor in general er you might have heard about the the the plans for the indians they don't (oh oh) i mention it in my paper you you obviously read about the indian plans to invest into yuganskneftegas er which is also an alternative in a way for to alternative to to europe so yes there is a competition for russian energy resources and russia because of of er of the demand huge demand in china russia has more leverage again over the the EU so there is a situation of competition er how far it may go i don't know er to be honest i'm not such a specialist on energy issues and how easily you can you know redirect for example oil flows from one part of the world to another that's that's another question er er russia energy strategy if i remember correctly does deal with the issue of energy savings er which is the first step at least in the direction of a more er of a greener energy energy situation and actually er energy savings in russia as i argue in in the written version of my paper is a huge source for for additional er energy a- a- additional export potential er in a er also in in relation to the european union er but as for renewables i think there are there are i think i think this is where culture basically enters the picture er we we don't speak we we don't we're we're not really concerned er in russia as much with a with er environmental issues in general but if we s- if we if you talk about renewables and alternative sources of energy it sounds almost like hey come on there is oil around <SS> @@ </SS> why do you care for all this stuff it's too expensive it's too unreliable no technologies really exist and so on so it's it's a huge difference in in consciousness if you want and between between especially scandinavia er northern europe and er and er and er russia so that's er and this is wha- w- there there is a role to play for the european union for the russian government and this is a ma- a matter of long term planning er for kyoto it's just erm i think it's er from from what i've read in the papers i'm not such a such a again such a specialist in this field but i think russia is moving more in the direction of the US despi- despite the fact that it has ratified the the the er the er protocol it's moving more in the direction of er sort of er voluntary restrictions and so on and er away from the european approach which is more like impo- imposition of the state quotas on on companies <S6> mhm-hm </S6> er but er i think it's the decision to ratify the protocol was a political decision to to to erm to satisfy the european union and in a way to to to to to to erm er to thank it for for the WTO entry and so on fo- for the for the treaty on on the WTO entry and i i think it remains to be seen how it really develops in the future i think the russian government doesn't have a clear strategy on the issue at the moment we are just witnessing the first stages of its development , thank you </S2>
<S1> thank you (xx) </S1>
<S3> okay thank you er er i got three questions from <NAME S6> and er i answer the following the first question was about the erm is there more cooperation than conflict inside the er [mhm the] </S3>
<S4> [the prices] <COUGH> <S3> sorry </S3> the prices </S4>
<S3> no no no no i i don't <S4> i er </S4> your question is you'll be next <SS> [@@] </SS> [so is there] more cooperation than conflict inside er russian energy community er the er answer is er well somewhere in between we have er (xx) examples of cooperation and conflict between russian oil and gas companies and partly er it ca- it can be explained by the fact that russian oil sector is now energy sector is now in transition if you'll take if you'll take er any OPEC country that have just one energy company that's it there's no @competition@ because of there's just unitary actors russian market is somewhere in transition and or we are witnessing different approaches of concentration if it'll be one super energy company i i have many doubts of that most probably it will be one super gas company we have it already <S6> mhm </S6> there is er attempts to control not just production of gas but also transportation of gas and production of this er liquid gas for selling er abroad and in terms of oil well the the trend is more or less to that trade but most probably we'll have er the process of annihilation i mean through er mergers and acquisitions of these small oil companies which were established by regions like balbash bas- bashkit- or what's its name torgneft and komioil already bought by er lukoil and so on so the er i mean at this moment there there's more probably competition than cooperation i- i- in the sector but because we have number of actors more than one in each part of the energy sector for the first question is is russia a unitary actor well the ans- i've already er gave that answer in my er in my presentation definitely not and the quas- er question of yuganskneftegas is very clear we have gasprom plus dmitri medvedev and we have rosneft plus igor sechin who are two deputies or i mean dmitri medvedev is the head of presidential administration and igor sechin is his deputy so er er if we'll take a bigger picture of russia as unitary actor in terms of its er the country which is able to define strategy and after that follow that strategy towards some regions towards some sectors of economy er the answers we would love too but not now er you would have to be a unitary actor but because of er different regional interests because of different business interests because of different orientation of russian oil companies to to what er cooperation with foreign capital we have good example of cooperation between gasprom and german capital we have er er number of er er good example of cooperation between oil companies like BP-TMK alliance at the same time er er these (xx) the kremlin access for oil investors to buy stakes in biggest russian oil company it's er it's really er the process i- in the very beginning of formation for example of course it was er decision of the kremlin to give a chance for what's his name texaco er the company which bought the piece of lukoil <SU-9> [chevron texaco surgutneftegaz] <SU> [(xx)] </SU> </SU-9> chevron texaco yeah er yeah it was political decision of course for it wasn't the choice of lukoil itself but i mean that that's er the process which is again going on er how energy interest defining the russian foreign policy at this moment i put the question back i answer in a er i answer back so it's foreign policy defo- define our energy interests and energy policy er partly because of as i already said in my presentation russia is well russia is not just small or medium-sized player in world politics russia is a big player and the the only its national resource which is obvious to everybody and which is in disposal of russian government russian president is energy that's why (xx) growing russian economy and probably there will be different tools for protection of its er national interest national political national economic interest but at this point energy is er one of the er major tools for er for implementation of foreign policy (xx) that's why and so on i put my answer back from you er er in terms of er institutions er question about er oil prices clear example of double standards for european union is your question on the topic er the er there's a country called u- united states of america and their prices of <SU> [(xx)] </SU> [(xx)] gas are absolutely the same as in russian federation we would love you to ask u- united states to move prices up we wish you all the best <SS> @@ </SS> er it's er it's the answer i mean there is also er like natural advantages of russia to have a lot of oil and proximity from oil to er consumers it's part of economic er answer but i mean that's er you probably don't need it there is (xx) example in the united states and we will finish (with such an) example er that was er if i i i don't know if i er understand the last question from the last row correctly er i will answer as i understood it and after that you may follow and so the question was about er the level of independence of russian companies in their investment politics well er if we'll take i- investments abroad er there are a number of examples when definite initiative was originated from inside the russian companies like cooperation of gasprom in india g- cooperation of lukoil in iraq rosneft in venezuela (surgutnefte) in belarus but every time when russian biggest er russian oil companies are making their investments abroad they coordinate their activities with minister of foreign affairs i'm not sure if they're coordinated with FSB or s- something like that but there is at least minister of foreign affairs er whose mission which was stated several times by putin by the putin established sort of new tradition that every summer he organising a meeting these all the ambassadors er er in foreign countries and representatives in international organisations he is speaking openly and behind the closed doors to them for two three hours last time it was more than two hours like two hours forty minutes and and the open part of that meeting he (xx) or was saying very explicitly about the pro- needed to protect interest of russian energy companies so that is a question er i mean that is er my answer i- if er i- the question was about investments inside the russia i mean definitely they are free <SU> yeah </SU> i mean they should negotiate with regional authorities probably there is a market for bribes and so on well we only speculate about that but inside the russia we have huge competition for example for komi-oil we had a huge competition between oi- er lukoil and these companies oriented around andrei vavilov and er er and so- some other thi- this part of mo- moscow er oil er group and lukoil won that and now komi is lukoil (xx) and it was in newspapers the competition in the in court and er and so on so that's ten minutes </S3>
<S1> thank you thank you erm i also would like to use the opportunity to ask one more question for <NAME S5> and it's er could you perhaps elaborate a bit more er on that er aspect you mention er how history is presenting in schroeder's er personal politics <NAME S6> already er touched this topic but is it somehow related to i would think about the tradition of ostpolitik er er er in the first place but er if you could ela- elaborate on that er as well </S1>
<S5> mhm-hm i anyway wanted to take the @historical@ part because i think it's very interesting from our question erm if if you if you look on on on this market institutions approach which really very much comes from the 80s with the old liberalisation of the energy markets first by by reagan and thatcher er they they i mean they started the whole process like deregulation liberalisation privatisation in the in the energy industries which then er got somehow a paradigm in in the european union and especially and only got a paradigm with the the creation of the internal market so this is quite quite important to keep in mind and this is very important for for the development what i er wanted to mention that we don't have yet a coherent energy policies on the european union level erm and then you had within this development in the 80s 90s with the privatisation in in in europe in the european markets erm you had then this huge chance of the dissolution of the soviet union and this idea which came up already in 91 to establish a huge energy market ranging really from erm some ideas vancouver to vladivostok <S6> mhm </S6> with this idea of getting more access for private companies into into the russian market especially because of all this what you mentioned because the OPEC countries are quite close they are dominated by states er monopoly so this was really the idea to get get an er common market of energy working erm and and the thing was i i really mu- very much stated it was somehow er really a european union project because this idea of establishing a dominated erm erm space of stability erm market institutions plus legal institutions and and widening this er area of stability of peace in concentric circles this is one er one of course the idea behind of establishing this huge energy market because the lessons learned and then i come to this the the german story behind is of course that energy erm relations of course bear a lot of possibility for conflicts for risks but they also have a huge need for cooperation especially if you talk about the long-term erm and depending on pipelines trade of gas so this really demands for cooperation and the lesson learned within this tradition of ostpolitik is that this really <S6> [mhm] </S6> [demands] for steady erm talks dialogue and cooperation so so this is the one storyline i would say would really push the idea of a common market but then the the european union somehow learned in the process that this energy charter treaty with this idea of establishing a common energy market didn't work because of er on the one hand i would say natural reasons russia to keep these assets and in in yeltsin times just remember then i can to the question you put of the leverage of energy companies especially in the caspian region for example i think you w- we could mention maybe a time from i would say 94 to 98 maybe when you really could see especially in the caspian a- area that you have really a freelancing of foreign policy of russian foreign policy to these companies i would say i would argue i mean this is very @sarcastically@ argued but and now we have to switch back under putin that he really tries to get control back not freelancing but really concentrating back this foreign policy too and and what this erm the the outcome is the so-called er yeah well the geopolitical influence of russia in the caspian region with the results you maybe have in mind with this so-called gas OPEC the eurasian gas lines that really russia has long-term contracts with turkmenistan with kazakhstan to buy their gas to free off russian gas to sell it to higher prices to the european market the lessons learned for the european union was that their their approach of multilateral cooperation market institutions these institutions didn't really work and so they really tried to well somehow establish this dialogue in the tradition of ostpolitik but on the other hand also learn that if other actors on these international energy market pursue a more state-relied approach really pursue a more geopolitical approach and we had US as one one example if you just look at the the energy annexes and the military bases of the US china you mentioned india all these are countries huge energy consumers i mean the re- price increases you saw last year are really from coming from the demand of china and and india and you have actors which are really pursuing a state-dominated approach really pushing their companies by subsidies whatever then the european co- union of course learned we we can't go further just with this multilateral approach what we more need is well a more common foreign security policy approach erm to really erm yeah secure the energy supplies to europe and this is somehow where it comes down in concrete terms to the german-russian relationship between putin and schroeder that you have somehow and this is it's (xx) already in germany of silence for gas keeping silence silent for gas in germany that schroeder n- n- da- didn't criticise putin for example i <S6> [mhm] </S6> [mean] this is (xx) policy not really talking about human rights policy if you look at the partnership agreement between russia and european union and look at the first draft and the first discussions really mu- very much basing on human rights as issues this is already mhm almost <SU> [mhm] </SU> [lost] or the question of the energy charter treaty i mean if i- er for me i always criticise the european union because relying on a partner which has blocked over several times the main approach to secure energy supply to europe is is somehow erm and i would say was somehow the kyoto protocol and the ratification was a kind of well it's it's the least erm common denominator and doesn't cost russia that much it would have cost much more to to keep further talking on transit protocol of the energy charter treaty </S5>
<S1> thank you erm there might be time for one more question if there er is one , erm if not so we have another session in an hour and there will be more time to discuss i i thank for all the questions and also i want to thank the panelists for excellent er presentations thank you </S1>
<APPLAUSE>
<S2> is it is it is it an hour or in a half in [half an hour] </S2>
<SU> [half an hour] </SU>
<S1> er in half an hour we will have ane- another session er there's a coffee break now so coffee will be served er on the floor on on the er corridor </S1>
